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Abstract
This paper describes the development of a new integrated approach to system safety engineering.  The approach is illustrated in a case study involving the design of a high-pressure experimental research facility.  The system safety engineering framework incorporates five main groups of activities, including system design visualization; failure modes and effects analysis; multidisciplinary teaming; benchmarking; and enterprise management.  Coupling a systems engineering approach with the recognized principals of failure mode avoidance was found to significantly enhance the engineering design process.  
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This paper summarizes an integrated approach to system safety engineering that was developed as part of the design stage for a new high-pressure experimental research facility in the United Kingdom for use in shock physics research.  The design stage of the experimental facility revealed a number of safety risks, which gave rise to the need to formulate and implement an integrated approach to system safety engineering so that these risks could be effectively managed.  This system safety engineering approach was focused on reducing or eliminating safety hazards through analysis of the system requirements early in the project lifecycle.  The system safety engineering framework was developed because despite there being a range of documented safety management techniques, there is little coverage of how these processes can be used together in order to support the engineering design process and especially in regard to the case for construction and facilities development programs. 
The wider discipline of systems engineering has been established for a number of years and this provides a recognized set of processes and techniques for the design and implementation of complex products and services through adoption of a holistic or systems-wide viewpoint.  Consequently, incorporating safety studies within systems engineering is logical since the systems focus encourages a broad treatment of safety risks.  Furthermore, where safety management is part of a wider program and systems engineering is utilized in order to reduce technical and business risks, then systems safety engineering can allow best practice management to be implemented early in the system lifecycle.
Related to safety management are the areas of reliability and risk assessment, which can be employed to determine different combinations of factors (or faults) that may give rise to reduced safety.  Through building on these underpinning areas, the system safety engineering framework illustrated within this paper rests on an innovative combination of engineering management processes, such as systems architecting and safety risk management through to enterprise management and benchmarking.  During the system design phase, the system safety engineering approach is to develop from the defined set of requirements an identification of potential hazards, for which risks are assessed and where possible mitigated.  This allows the system to then be modified (if possible) so that the risks can either be reduced or eliminated.  In this regard, risks can be viewed as being a combination of the probability of a particular hazard occurring and a certain level of severity or magnitude for the hazard.  Moreover, the ability to ensure that hazards are effectively and adequately contained, through the use of risk assessments and supporting methodologies as part of the design stage, has been standardized across a number of industries, such as within the chemical process sector and the construction industry.  Consequently, achieving optimized design through delivering system requirements, while minimizing safety risks, is of major importance for engineering programs and especially facilities development initiatives such as the one described in this paper.
The ability to develop an integrated system safety engineering framework that can be utilized in different industries and across a range of engineering applications will need to build on established engineering management processes.  Such an approach will enhance the utility and usefulness of the framework since the individual processes and supporting activities will already be familiar to engineering managers.  Therefore, the framework described in this paper can be used as a management tool to minimize program risk and to improve the engineering design process, and the approach can be readily implemented by engineering managers.
After the introductory remarks on system safety engineering, a description of decision support tools for engineering system design is provided that were used in the design of the facility development project.  The integrated system safety engineering framework will then be introduced together with a supporting technique for assessing decision-making requirements, followed by discussion of the process tools and methodologies employed.  This discussion is based on the case study application of the framework to the design of a high-pressure experimental research facility.  The discussion is followed by conclusions and a set of recommendations for implementation of the system safety engineering framework.  

Engineering system design
Engineering system design has been linked to the achievement of a number of basic principles, such as those described by Bahill and Botta (2008), which include the use of models to design systems; control of the level of interacting entities; understanding the enterprise; the need for functions to be documented; design for testability; accommodating the behavior of people; etc.  These principles are important, but engineers and engineering managers have developed specific decision-making tools to guide the engineering system design process, for example, quality assurance and control techniques and processes to identify and mitigate failure modes.  
	The focus of the system safety engineering framework is to integrate these methodologies with the purpose of improving engineering system design.  In the case of, for example, the installation of a chemical process reactor, the tangible outcomes from application of the framework could include improvements across a number of derived metrics, such as a reduced number of post-installation modifications to the reactor; increased availability of the facility due to reduced faults reported and improved reliability; as well as increased user satisfaction from the technical operators of the facility. An important technique for improving system reliability is failure mode avoidance (FMA).  There are two main causes of failure modes, lack of robustness and mistakes.  Both mistakes and design decisions can lead to a lack of system robustness and, as a result, failures.  Consequently, an adequate focus on detecting and subsequently managing failure modes in design will lead to a more robust and reliable system.  Clausing and Frey (2005) examined the use of failure mode avoidance using an operating window approach to detect failure modes for jet engine turbine blades.  Incorporating this approach into the design of turbine blades increased the robustness of the blades (i.e. ‘effective life’).  In a different area, Henshall and Campean (2009) applied FMA in the automotive industry, through the adoption of widely used tools, including function fault tree analysis, P-diagrams, and design verification.  These previous studies support the application of failure modes avoidance during engineering system design as an enabler for improved reliability and robustness.
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is another quality and risk assessment tool.  FMEA is used to capture potential failure modes, the causes of failure, and required process controls.  The results of this analysis can be used to modify engineering designs, so that any identified failure modes are removed, or the likelihood of impact for a failure mode is reduced.  Teoh and Case (2004) described how FMEA is a generic methodology that can be applied to different industries and show that there is a need to develop supporting models to handle different levels of engineering knowledge.  The FMEA process requires a system function diagram (e.g. system architecture) so that failure modes can be identified for each subsystem or component in the diagram.  As part of the process, different visualization techniques have been used, including fuzzy cognitive maps, which allow qualitative information to be captured (Peláez and Bowles, 1996).  This previous work highlights how causal effect modeling can be adapted for different circumstances, thereby allowing varying levels of knowledge to be accommodated.  
An approach that seeks to move beyond purely safety risk analysis is the STAMP (safety-theoretic accident modeling and processes) methodology, which considers a range of risk types, namely technical, organizational and social risks (Leveson, 2004).  This broad-based management framework builds on systems theory, where safety is viewed as a control issue and where safety management is a control structure within an adaptive socio-technical system.  As part of the main process within the framework, a safety control structure diagram is developed. The diagram illustrates the control actions as well as the system hierarchy. 
The techniques described above were used in developing the system safety engineering framework and subsequently, an integrated approach to the management of safety and risks in the design of an engineering system of the case study project.  This approach was needed to reduce the risks resulting from technical uncertainties that existed.  These uncertainties were compounded by a lack of existing engineering management processes, structures, and supporting techniques related to safety practices to guide the engineering design.  

Developing an Integrated System Safety Engineering Framework




	The framework is composed of five main groups of activities that when combined represents an approach for ensuring the safety of engineering systems, which is grounded on existing engineering management best practices from the literature.  These groups of activities do not necessarily have to be conducted in any particular sequence.  However, the approach used was to carry out system design visualization at the initial stage with further systems architecting undertaken later on to focus on more complex aspects of the engineering design.  FMEA follows the initial systems architecture work.  With the exception of these dependencies, the other groups of activities within the framework can be employed in parallel or when the program allows.  Therefore, the usefulness of the framework is enhanced because of the potential to adapt the focus according to the particular engineering program requirements.  The framework consists of the following elements:
1.	System design visualization: This involves the use of graphical tools to map parts of the engineering system that are being designed and which are subject to safety risks that can impact the performance of the engineering program.  There is a choice available in the type of system visualizations that can be utilized and the visualization is dependent on the specific application.
2.	Failure modes and affects analysis: FMEA is a central tool that provides a probabilistic analysis of the potential modes of failure.  FMEA can be used to identify preventative actions.  The FMEA process can be modified based on the complexity of the system design, i.e. the level of analysis included in FMEA worksheets can be highly detailed for extensive and multifaceted systems, or alternatively can be rather more basic for simpler applications.
3.	Multidisciplinary teaming: This is based on the need for a range of relevant disciplines to be reflected in safety engineering planning and implementation.  This approach helps ensure adequate inclusion of different perspectives on safety risks and can vary according to the functions or disciplines represented in the overall project, e.g. laboratory technicians may well view safety risks differently to project management staff.
4.	Benchmarking: This element entails a systematic comparison and analysis of equivalent safety engineering practices that are utilized within different organizations.  In order for the comparison to reveal useful information there needs to be a degree of commonality between the safety practices that are being benchmarked as well as a supportive relationship between the organizations involved so as to facilitate information exchange.
5.	Enterprise management: This element focuses on the need to integrate system safety engineering and the supporting technical and social considerations with the wider organizational management structures.  Moreover, ensuring that system safety engineering is part of a wider hierarchy of safety management is important on a number of levels for effective governance and control of engineering programs as well as for management oversight of the engineering design process.




Case Study Investigation of a High-Pressure Research Facility
The case study investigation involved application of the system safety engineering framework to the design stage for a new high-pressure experimental research facility at the Institute of Shock Physics within the Imperial College London in the United Kingdom (the university).  This initiative represented a significant undertaking for the university, involving the design of a complex set of mechanical and electrical (M&E) services together with supporting construction activities.  A corresponding facility development project was required to upgrade an existing large laboratory in order to accommodate the new high-pressure equipment.  The high-pressure equipment was designed for the purpose of undertaking research in the area of shock physics, which involves research on the behavior of materials under high strain rates.  In order to achieve this goal, a new high-pressure experimental research facility that would allow materials to be investigated at pressures on a gigapascal (GPa) scale was to be built.  The project had a number of design risks, since both the design of the laboratory services and the design of the equipment needed to be undertaken in parallel.  
The research facility was jointly funded by the university and an industrial partner.  The resulting facilities development project was reported previously (Philbin, 2008). This previous research provided an initial assessment of the use of systems engineering to help support the project’s overall planning and management.  As part of the design of the new facility, there was a need to ensure safety risks were identified early on, so that the overall design could be modified to take into account the necessary mitigation measures.  There was also a need to build confidence at the university in the facility design. This confidence was contingent on proving the facility’s safety.  The use of system safety engineering was therefore undertaken in this context and was oriented to provide outputs and recommendations that would contribute to the establishment of the new research facility.
Many of the technical risks for the facilities development project were related to the systems integration between the services and the corresponding engineering components and structures of the equipment.  An inability to adequately control these integration points could compromise the robustness of the engineering system and decrease the performance of the equipment.  Furthermore, there were significant safety risks to manage as the equipment was required to generate high pressures (e.g. on a GPa scale) through the use of pressurized gas.  The following sections discuss each of the framework’s five elements and how they were applied in the case study.  

(1). System Design Visualizations




	This system architecture was developed from the viewpoint of system operation and provides an overall view of the connectivity of the key sub-systems that are required for the operation of the experimental facility.  Although the SADT architecture provided an overall view of the engineering system that was designed, each of the subsystems in the architecture (A0-1 through A0-5) had its own set of engineering architectures that were designed and assembled in order to generate a complete design package.  For example, A0-3, the integrated power supply subsystem, had a series of electrical architectures and individual wiring diagrams that described the location of the 15 amp power sockets and three-phase power supplies as well as the design and configuration of the power relay junctions. 
	Using the SADT architecture as a decision-support tool in the engineering design process had a number of advantages.  It helped the engineering design team to handle complex information during the requirements capture stage, including portraying requirements in a hierarchical manner; it provided a representation of the design, which was reviewed by team members; and it acted as a mechanism to guide technical analysis and discussions (e.g. as part of the FMEA process in the case study). It also provided the basis for comparative analysis between different engineering designs. 




	The safety control structure diagram can be considered as a more complex form of system design visualization, since formulating the system safety engineering through a safety control structure can help to identify the dependencies between the different safety-related activities and which takes into account both technical and social considerations.  Moreover, the diagram is built on the premise that the required control of safety cannot be achieved without consideration of both system development as well as system operations.  This is especially relevant for the high-pressure research facility, since there was an extended design stage lasting over a year, during which there were a series of modifications to the equipment and facility design.  These modifications had to take into account the eventual operation of the facility as well as performance requirements in terms of the desired pressure levels and corresponding shock physics experimental parameters.   One such modification was the decision to change the design of the high-pressure chamber, which needed to have a longer configuration as well as a larger ‘footprint’.  These changes were undertaken so that an additional type of shock physics experiments could be carried out with the equipment, thereby enhancing the utility of the facility.  Initially when this change was identified there was difficulty in determining the specific engineering solution for the equipment and so this had the potential to impact negatively on the design process.  However, through a number of meetings of the project’s working group, involving the university and the main industrial partner, it was possible to identify an alternative equipment configuration to meet the enhanced experimental conditions and still be suitable to be housed in the laboratory that would accommodate the equipment.  The working group and its interactions with other key areas, such as ‘project management’, ‘system safety engineering’, and ‘facilities design’ were encapsulated in the safety control diagram and this highlights the interconnected nature of these activities and processes.
Others features of the safety control structure diagram include a recognition of the control processes in terms of both social and technical parameters, as well as the hierarchical control structures that collectively contribute to the required level of safety robustness.  Clearly when considering engineering design, the technical features are prominent.  However, as the Leveson approach seeks to reinforce, the social inputs to system safety engineering can also be crucial.  In the case study, the ability of the staff at the university to form good working relationships with key staff at the partner company was important.  Had such a social dimension of the initiative not been properly handled, it is doubtful that the complex design process, which required much consultation between the organizations involved, would have been successfully completed.  Additional social aspects included the need for the project’s management to ensure senior levels of the university were kept appraised of key developments in the facilities design and supporting safety case.  This was important because the continued support of the university was required in terms of financial investment in the facility as well as the eventual management approval of the safety case.

(2). Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)




	The use of FMEA was a crucial part of the system safety engineering for the new facility, because it provided a mechanism to capture individual design criteria that were required in order to develop robust and reliable equipment and facilities design.  These design criteria could then be evaluated through the FMEA analysis, which identified potential failure modes in regards to occurrence, severity and detection.  This resulted in a standardized approach to safety risk management for product and service design as well as process development (Carbone and Tippett, 2004).
	As the worksheet in Exhibit 5 highlights, the identified fault with the highest RPN (risk priority number) was a failure of the pressure vessel or pipework.  The identification of such faults and the ability to rank them according to RPN was an instructive process, as it allowed the project to ensure most attention was focused on mitigating these potential failure modes.  However, due to the importance of the project, it was decided that all the required action points would be acted on and not just the ones relating to faults with an RPN above an arbitrary number.  These action points amounted to twenty eight distinct activities that were identified. In order to systematically ensure that safety design risks were minimized as much as possible, all of these required activities were undertaken.  These activities varied widely and include, for example, the development of procedures to prevent staff being present in the laboratory if oxygen levels were too low (FMEA worksheet function: general laboratory ventilation) and the determination of the appropriate extraction level or rate (FMEA worksheet function: localized gas extraction subsystem).  Specifically, the FMEA process and use of the supporting worksheets allowed identification of the following safety parameters:
	Potential mode of failure for the system function or requirement.
	Potential effects of failure (which determines severity level).
	Potential causes of failure (which determines occurrence level).
	Required process controls (which determines detection level).
	Risk priority number (RPN) and criticality number.
	Required action.
Although the required actions at this stage were determined to contribute to an improved facilities design, it should be noted that there were also actions related to equipment operations. Therefore, when the FMEA was undertaken for the operations stage, some of these points were also present in these worksheets.  The FMEA process proved to be highly beneficial in contributing to the optimized design of both the high-pressure equipment and the supporting laboratory services and infrastructure.  It also provided a mechanism for capturing the technical information generated as well as recording the decisions.  This helped capture issues in the early stages of the project. Previously, there had been a number of team meetings where safety and design matters were discussed, but without an overall framework to capture the information generated and decisions made.  The use of the FMEA process and worksheets reduced the uncertainties of this situation through providing structure to the discussions as well as the actual recording of the safety analyses and supporting decisions.  
	The use of a multidisciplinary (or cross-functional) team was an essential part of the FMEA process and this will be discussed next.  Indeed a shortcoming of FMEA can arise when there is an insufficiently wide perspective brought to bear on the analysis.  Consequently, problems may occur when the FMEA is undertaken only by quality or management professionals without the input of technical or engineering design professionals.  It is therefore crucial that there is relevant technical input to the process from staff with the relevant technical expertise and experience to identify and comment on the potential failure modes.

(3). Multidisciplinary Teaming
Multidisciplinary teaming can help contribute to the success of a certain initiative, since any discussions or decisions that take place will more likely include the range of different perspectives and issues that can influence the particular initiative.  Areas where there can be particular benefits from a multidisciplinary team approach include new product development as well as construction projects (Fong, 2003).  In the latter case, construction projects include design and construction constraints, and are well suited to analysis and implementation through a range of different perspectives.  However, the very characteristic that promotes a broader consideration of issues within multidisciplinary teams can unfortunately also act as a potential limiting factor according to work by Ratcheva (2009).  This is because differences in approaches to decision-making and professional language can potentially hinder team building.   Therefore, to address this issue, it has been suggested that new multidisciplinary teams need to develop their own ways of working.  Such patterns of working could include the identification of a common set of terminologies for the technical activities; for instance, in the case study there was an initial confusion over the type of high-pressure equipment to be designed.  Consequently, once the university and industrial partner had agreed on which set of pressure parameters for which the equipment would be designed, then it was possible to explore the available equipment design configurations in more detail.  This approach allowed differences in professional language and terminology to be overcome. 
	In terms of the system safety engineering case study of the new high-pressure facility, multidisciplinary teaming was used throughout the overall facilities project as a way to ensure the full range of perspectives were accommodated.  The multidisciplinary team, which was called the working group, included the following personnel:
	Project director: Responsible for overall direction of the project; liaison with senior management; establishing an overall safety ‘code of practice’ for the Institute’s operations.
	Project manager: Responsible for management of the project, including project planning, cost control and scheduling project tasks.
	Safety auditor: Responsible for safety legislation and university safety procedures; specialist safety expertise.
	Technical authority: Industry partner representatives who provided technical design advice, shock physics and diagnostics input.
	Academic leader: Responsible for academic input on shock physics experiments.
	Laboratory manager: Responsible for developing the technical safety case, including laboratory safety ‘code of practice’ documentation.
	External advisers: M&E (mechanical and electrical) and structural engineering external contractors who provided specialist technical advice.
	The above list of key personnel involved in the system safety engineering activities highlights that there were a diverse collection of different viewpoints. This proved to be a distinct asset to the project.  The multidisciplinary team met formally every three months and throughout the project design stage and developed the safety case in parallel.  This was undertaken so that the outputs from the individual safety activities could contribute to a more robust and reliable design for both the laboratory infrastructure and supporting services as well as the actual high-pressure equipment.  Although the working group brought together all the main technical stakeholders for the project, during the design stage a smaller project design team also met monthly so that technical progress could be reviewed in detail.  
	Problems did occur initially when the first working group came together, particularly as the more technically focused members of the team had a different perspective of the initiative compared to the general management and safety staff.  The difference in perspective included disagreement on the project’s timeframe as well as the eventual performance levels to be achieved by the equipment.  This disagreement subsequently gave rise to a certain level of conflict that required careful management by the project director and academic leader.  However, once the working group had met a number of times, the conflict dissipated.  This was due to members of the group learning to work together, which included developing a common understanding of the technical issues as well as agreement on a realistic set of expectations for the project.

(4). Benchmarking
Benchmarking has been applied to a number of different areas of management. There have been some studies in the literature where safety best practices have been benchmarked through a planned assessment of safety processes.  Henson (2006) has described a number of benchmark drivers for safety effectiveness within an organization, ranging from executive involvement, employee participation, teamwork, and process improvement to assimilation of safety practice into standard organizational processes.
	Obtaining safety best practice information from the perceptions of key personnel presents a challenge, as this can represent tacit knowledge that is difficult to codify.  Consequently, Ramírez et al. (2004) have developed a qualitative benchmarking system for the construction industry, which found that safety performance was positively correlated to organizations having superior planning and control systems, quality management, cost control as well as subcontract management procedures.  Benchmarking has also been used to assess safety climates in hazardous environments (Mearns et al., 2001), where the strength of an organization’s safety climate was found to influence its risk management abilities, thereby highlighting the benefit of encouraging a positive safety climate.  
	The case study investigation involved the use of benchmarking to assess safety management systems utilized by collaborators in the shock physics field and initially this was undertaken with two university collaborators and one industrial partner.  This benchmarking exercise had the following objectives:
1.	To identify the procedures and management structures used at the other organizations, which had already been developed for shock physics applications and where best practice could be identified.  These procedures contained technical insights and recommendations for the use of high-pressure equipment.  It was therefore possible to incorporate some of these points in the documentation being generated at the university.
2.	To identify supporting technical information that had been generated for risk assessments and safe operating procedures, which could be used to compare across the different university organizations.  This technical information included information on process controls, laboratory staffing and permitted materials usage.
3.	To start building a community of like-minded professionals, who collectively sought to raise the standards for safety management.  This was a long-term goal that would be developed as a consequence of achieving the first two objectives.  Nevertheless, the ability to build this technical and safety knowledge across the collaborative program was perceived as a value adding activity that could also potentially contribute to the development of future high-pressure facilities.
The safety management benchmarking activities provided valuable information to help inform the development of the facilities safety case at the university.  The actual benchmarking activities mainly centered on structured meetings with the collaborative partner organizations, where information was shared on the different aspects of safety, together with the exchange of key safety documentation.  The success of such meetings was, however, dependent on there being an existing good working relationship with the partner (benchmark) organization, so that technical information could easily be shared between the institutions. 

(5). Enterprise Management
The adoption of the enterprise management viewpoint has been explored across different organizational domains, such as enterprise resource planning and architecture development for IT operations integration, and the development of improved corporate risk management (Coffin, 2009).  This latter approach, involving integration of different organizational functions within the enterprise, has been shown to offer clear benefits, such as enhanced control and governance, effective communication, improved risk management, etc.  Application of enterprise management thinking to safety management is clearly highly relevant to the aforementioned benefits.  On this matter, Law et al. (2006) have used the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to identify key criteria for safety management systems, such as the need for clear client requirements, insurance company requirements and employee requirements.
	As part of the case study investigation, systems level planning, through the visualization methods described previously, allowed wider dependencies to be identified.  Moreover, detailed technical activities focused on specific safety risk issues to be managed and which provided granularity to the system safety engineering.  In this regard, the resulting safety case for the new experimental research facility was brought together as part of the safety ‘code of practice’ document for the high-pressure laboratory.  This was a single source of safety information, procedures and guidance for the safe operation of the new facility.  The documentation builds on the decisions made during the design stage of the facilities development project, which in turn was informed by the system safety engineering activities, such as systems architecting and FMEA.  This code of practice was required to be linked to the wider enterprise. Also, an Institute level code of practice was developed, which in turn related to corporate safety documentation and procedures for the university.  The Institute code of practice contained overall guidance for all the technical activities to be undertaken within the Institute, of which the shock physics laboratory is a part.  This can be seen from the contents of the Institute code of practice, which is as follows:
1.	Introduction (background; research themes; corporate safety policies and procedures).
2.	Organisation (organisation structure; roles and responsibilities; safety approvals; safety planning and auditing).
3.	Facilities development (high-pressure facility; other experimental facilities).
4.	Offsite working regulations.
5.	Procedures to accommodate visiting staff and students.
6.	Sub-contract management arrangements.
7.	Training provision.
8.	Communication of safety issues.
The integration of the safety procedures and documentation (as detailed in the previous safety control structure diagram) with the Institute code of practice was a deliberate attempt to ensure effective enterprise management, so that safety risks were adequately controlled.  This approach provided a mechanism of ensuring the system safety engineering studies and the facilities design process adhered to the university’s management processes and overall policies for safety management.  This linking of the facilities safety case with the university’s corporate policies on safety provided assurance to the university’s senior management that the engineering design would ultimately deliver an experimental facility with acceptable levels of safety risk for the university, which would be controlled according to university procedures for safety management. 
Although the concept of enterprise management has been largely pursued in an IT/IS context, it has been included in the system safety engineering framework as a mechanism to reinforce the need to have clear linkages between engineering activities and general management processes and structures.  This was especially relevant to the development of the safety case for the new high pressure facility as the university’s general management staff needed to be kept aware of the major safety risks that arose and the mitigation measures implemented to address these points.  Other benefits to the adoption of an enterprise management approach in the case study included the use of a management framework that was consistent with other safety practices at the university; a structure that allowed the enforcement of mandatory safety policies; as well as a mechanism to facilitate trouble-shooting, reviews and safety audits and the communication of safety engineering advice. 

Concluding remarks
System safety engineering has been explored through an analysis of some of the available tools and techniques that can help identify and manage safety risks, which include risks to the project and business performance.  As a result, this study did not utilize a traditional interpretation of safety risk.  The holistic treatment of safety is consistent with a systems view that seeks to determine the wider implications of design risk.  The literature review supports the role of failure mode avoidance in improving the engineering design process coupled with the potential for system safety engineering to ensure robust system design.  This literature review also supports a selection of various decision support tools, including systems architecting, FMEA and STAMP.
	Through building on studies in the literature it has been possible to formulate an integrated approach to system safety engineering that is composed of five main groups of activities, which are: (1) system design visualization; (2) FMEA; (3) multidisciplinary teaming; (4) benchmarking; and (5) enterprise management.  This system safety engineering framework has been generated as a general methodology for developing the safety case for engineering programs.  It has potential utility in different industrial sectors and engineering situations.  Furthermore, a tool for identifying and categorizing issues as part of the decision-making requirements process has been suggested.  This tool can be used as a planning aid to help initiate the system safety engineering process and to drive forward the five main groups of activities.
	The case study investigation of the system safety engineering framework for a high-pressure experimental research facility involved deployment of a range of decision-support tools.  The use of rigorous engineering management processes ensured that as the designs for the new equipment and facilities matured, safety and operational risks were mitigated through an overall adoption of failure mode avoidance.  In related work, as engineering systems become more complex and evolve into so called ‘system-of-systems’, the potential for system architectures to drive forward engineering design becomes more apparent (DiMario, Cloutier, and Verma, 2008).  In the case study application, the use of systems visualization techniques helped to identify the primary and supporting functions of the facilities system as well as the key dependencies.  These dependencies, such as the overall interconnectivity between the system development and system operations for the high-pressure facility, were explored through the use of systems diagramming, which helped to ensure a comprehensive treatment of safety, business and organizational risks. 
The use of the system safety engineering framework in the case study allowed the facilities development project to progress through a difficult and extended design stage.  Consequently, the project was able to transition to a construction stage that included installation of the mechanical and electrical services and high-pressure lines.  Moreover, the system safety engineering approach provided the project team with the necessary toolset to ensure that safety risks were mitigated in the engineering design of the facility.  Amongst the project team members, it was believed that utilization of this toolset significantly improved the facility design by avoiding a number of safety hazards and by increasing system reliability.  Central to the advantages of employing the system safety engineering framework was the ability to ensure the engineering design process proceeded smoothly.  The use of the framework also represented an innovative combination of the five main groups of activities that allowed a systemic treatment of risk management but through building on established engineering management practice.  Consequently, such an approach can be readily utilized by other engineering managers.
In terms of tangible benefits that arose from adoption of the framework, there were a number observed within the facilities development project and reported by those involved.  As the facilities development project progressed through the corresponding stages, which started at the conceptual stage, followed by feasibility study, initial design and then final design, there was a need to gradually build up the safety case.  The use of the system safety engineering framework provided evidence to allow the senior stakeholders for the facilities project (the project’s board) to approve the safety case for the project as it progressed through these stages.  Feedback from the members of the project board confirmed this situation and there were comments that had such a systematic approach not been employed then it is unlikely that the facilities design would have been able to transition to the final design stage and then on to construction.  The project board also felt that the use of structured management techniques, such as the FMEA process, helped to minimize the project’s overall risks in addition to the actual technical safety risks.  These outcomes were significant because the university had minimal experience in developing the design and the safety case for this type of experimental research facility and so there was significant uncertainty around the technical feasibility of the facility and whether or not an acceptable safety case could be generated.  The design process itself took over a year to be completed and further comments by the project board emphasized that it would have been highly unlikely that the design and accompanying safety case could have been produced in this timeframe had it not been for the use of the system safety engineering framework described.
	It is interesting to note the nature of the five groups of activities in regards to their split between operational versus strategic orientation.  System design visualization and FMEA are both methodologies that are recognized engineering tools and can be regarded as being operational in nature.  They are techniques that are taught in engineering management courses and degree programs. The basic principles of these techniques could be expected to be understood by most engineering managers.  Benchmarking may also be undertaken both within and between organizations as an operational activity, although it is likely to involve greater management oversight especially where there are external interactions with other organizations. Benchmarking can therefore also be considered as being operational but with a degree of strategic focus.  Similarly, multidisciplinary teaming can be a feature of operational activities, although again there could be a degree of management and strategic direction so as to ensure the team is staffed appropriately.  Consequently, multidisciplinary teaming can be regarded as being operational but with a degree of strategic character.  Finally, enterprise management is likely to have a more strategic focus, since an ability to integrate system safety engineering with other management hierarchies clearly requires management direction in order to ensure the integration takes place.  Enterprise management is likely to be a planned initiative that involves different groups or departments; something that will be necessary in order to ensure there is an adequate interaction throughout the enterprise; e.g., as detailed in the system operations side of the safety control structure diagram.
Improving engineering design through the early adoption of failure modes avoidance practice represented a robust engineering management approach.  Moreover, utilizing the standardized tools and techniques of systems engineering as well as a broader appreciation of the wider system of interest through engineering systems thinking was also a logical progression.  The ability, then, to bring these developments together as part of the proposed system safety engineering framework that has been developed in this paper contributes to an improved engineering design process that results in improvements in reliability as well as in minimizing safety risk.
Through consideration of the research reported in this paper and the case study investigation, it is possible to formulate a set of recommendations for system safety engineering:
1.	Engineering design can be enhanced through failure mode avoidance, which allows the eventual design to include countermeasures for identified failure modes.
2.	FMEA is an effective tool to identify the specific information behind the potential failure modes, probable causes and countermeasure options.  Potential visualization techniques that can be used to support FMEA include systems architectures, function trees, fault tree analysis diagrams, boundary diagrams, and system state flow diagrams
3.	Safety-related control processes for a given system will depend on the hierarchies within the system as well as the constraints imposed by such hierarchies.  Safety control structure diagramming is an effective technique to ensure these control processes are identified and to ensure that social and technical dimensions are also considered.
4.	Adoption of system safety engineering can be reliant on there being a supportive environment for knowledge-sharing, so as to enable effective use of the decision-support tools and communication between the key stakeholders.  In this regard, multidisciplinary teaming, benchmarking, and enterprise management can help create such an environment.
5.	System safety engineering programs require adequate support from senior management and also the necessary funding.
Future research is recommended for the application of the system safety engineering framework to different industrial situations and different types of engineering scenarios, which would allow the general utility of the approach to be tested.  The case study investigation centered on the development and use of a framework to support the design of a facilities development project and this approach to the management of safety could be readily applied to other types of construction applications.  The framework seeks to provide engineering management practitioners with a toolset of techniques that can be applied to engineering programs that lack supporting engineering management methodologies.  This approach could pay particular dividends in the production of engineering system designs that are optimized for reliability and where safety risks must be minimized.  It is also suggested that a comparison of the framework be undertaken with other safety management processes.  Further work on the framework itself could focus on the development of more quantitative measures within each of the five groups of activities that could be used to complement the largely qualitative approaches that have been utilized thus far.
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Exhibit 5. Design level FMEA worksheet (part of) for high-pressure experimental research facility



